Topic: Security
Blog Brand: The Buzz
Region: Americas
Tags: A2/ad, Drones, Logistics, Security, and U.S. Marine Corps
April 28, 2025
By: Maya Carlin
The drone’s long range and autonomous guidance allows it to launch from outside of Chinese missile threat envelopes and reach its destination unaided.
Beginning in January of this year, several U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) units in Okinawa and North Carolina haveengagedin drills and tests involving semi-submersible resupply drones. While not a new concept, these are some of the first major exercises for these vehicles and mark the next step in achieving full integration into USMC units. Their purpose is resupply in contested environments where traditional aerial or maritime methods may be challenging. In particular, they may prove instrumental in providing Naval Strike Missiles to dispersed units on Pacific Islands in a conflict with China.
As planners consider strategies in apotentialwar in the Pacific, one of the major challenges is achieving anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) to Chinese shipping and logistics throughout the South China Sea and First Island Chain. The problem is the inverse of that facing the United States and its allies—namely, that missiles based on mainland China can threaten assets throughout the theater from relative safety. Traditional means of contesting the area, ships and planes, would be forced to defend against those missiles, putting them at risk and degrading their capabilities.
In order to counter this tactic, the USMC has begunplanningto detach small, mobile units of Marines on multiple islands equipped with the Navy-Marine Corps Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS). Essentially a missile launcher mounted on a remote vehicle—the Remotely Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary Fires (ROGUE)—ROGUE NMESIS would allow these Marine units to project power while remaining relatively flexible and low profile.
The challenge associated with fielding this system in the way the USMC plans, with dispersed units across multiple islands, is resupply. As mentioned, the Chinese military will be able to interdict most traditional logistics vessels and vehicles. To overcome this difficulty, the USMC turned to lessons learned from combating drug trafficking from South America, specifically, the difficulty in locating semi-submersible craft. Because of their low profile and fiberglass construction, these craft are difficult to detect with radar, sonar, or visually; thus, finding them in the ocean is quite the challenge.
Learning from this, the USMC has purchased a limited number of Autonomous Low-Profile Vessels (ALPVs) for testing. According to Brig. Gen. Simon Doran, thisvesselis essentially “just a narco-boat. We stole the idea from friends down south.” At 55 feet long, the ALPVs are capable of carrying two NMESIS missiles in their current configuration but could also see modifications to carry other types of ammunition or food and medical supplies. Like the narco semi-subs, the ALPV’s low visual profile and stealthy construction will make it exceedingly difficult to target. Its long range means Navy or Marine Corps logistics vessels can launch them from outside of Chinese missile threat envelopes and its autonomous guidance will allow it to reach its destination unaided. These capabilities will allow the USMC to resupply its NMESIS systems without fear of interruption.
About the Author: Maya Carlin
Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter:@MayaCarlin. Carlin has over 1,000 articles published over the last several years on various defense issues.
Image: DVIDS.
